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Nicole Hassoun’s Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, 
Expanding Obligations (2012) offers a novel argument for the existence of 
positive rights for the world’s poor, and explores institutional alternatives 
suitable for the realization of those rights. Hassoun’s argument is contractualist 
(in the broad sense), and makes the existence of positive rights depend 
upon the conditions necessary for meaningful consent to the global order. It 
thus provides an interesting example of social contract theory in the global 
context. But Hassoun’s argument relies crucially upon the ambiguous nature 
of the concept of consent. Drawing broadly upon the social contract theory 
tradition, Hassoun relies upon actual consent theory, democratic theory, and 
hypothetical consent theory. Each theoretical approach makes use of its own 
conception of consent. Rather than select one of these conceptions over 
the others, she makes use of all three. In doing so, she introduces a crucial 
ambiguity into the terms that, on her account, a legitimate global order must 
satisfy. The resolution of this ambiguity will circumscribe any effort, on the 
part of Hassoun or others, to specify the terms of any global social contract.
Keywords: Consent, Global Justice, Globalization, Legitimacy, Nicole 
Hassoun, Positive Rights, Social Contract Theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nicole Hassoun’s Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, 
Expanding Obligations (2012) brings social contract theory to bear on the 
problem of global poverty. She attempts to identify some of the terms that 
must be satisfied by any set of principles suitable for the governance of the 
* Earlier versions of the argument made here were presented at the 2013 Manchester 
Workshops in Political Theory and at the conference “Social Contract Theory: Past Present, and 
Future”, University of Lisbon, May 15-17, 2014. I am grateful for the comments and suggestions 
received at these events. Work on this paper was supported by a grant from the Arts and Social 
Sciences Benefaction Fund at Trinity College Dublin.
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global arena —by any global social contract, if you will. Among these terms 
Hassoun focuses upon a number of obligations the world order incurs 
towards the world’s poor. Or, putting things the other way around, her focus 
is upon the rights that a global social contract must guarantee the poor. 
Given the persistence and severity of global poverty, the importance of her 
project is hard to overstate.
In bringing the idea of a social contract to bear in the global arena, 
Hassoun is in very good company. Some of the most important work on 
global justice over the past fifty years has made similar use of social contract 
theory (e.g., Beitz 1999, Rawls 1999a). But social contract theory carries with 
it a large amount of philosophical baggage. This baggage includes persistent 
philosophical problems that have proven very difficult to solve. In this short 
paper, I wish to focus upon one of these problems —the problem of consent. 
The concept of consent is critical to social contract theory; it does little good 
to speak of a contract if one cannot also speak of people consenting to that 
contract in some way. But there are various ways of speaking about consent 
in the social contract tradition. The concept of consent has, within that 
tradition, given rise to various conceptions of consent. 1 Any effort to defend 
some vision of the social contract must specify a sense in which people can 
be said to consent to this vision, or else risk introducing a critical ambiguity. 
Such ambiguity, I shall argue, bedevils Hassoun’s efforts to defend the terms 
she wishes to attach to a global social contract.
2. CONSENT IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
Globalization and Global Justice offers a novel argument for the existence 
of positive rights for the world’s poor. 2 Hassoun dubs this argument the 
Autonomy Argument 3, and it proceeds as follows:
(1) Coercive institutions must be legitimate.
(2)  For a coercive institution to be legitimate it must ensure that its 
subjects secure sufficient autonomy to autonomously consent to, or 
dissent from, its rules (henceforth, sufficient autonomy).
(3)  Everyone, to secure this autonomy, must secure some food and 
water, and most require some shelter, education, health care, social 
support, and emotional goods.
(4)  There are many coercive international institutions.
(C)  So, these institutions must ensure that their subjects secure food, 
water, and whatever else they need for sufficient autonomy 
1. On the concept/conception distinction, see Rawls (1999b, 5).
2. I examine the specifics of Hassoun’s argument in more detail in Stone (Forthcoming-b).
3. Hassoun refers to this argument, with minor differences in wording, as the legitimacy 
argument elsewhere in the book (92).
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(Hassoun’s emphasis; Hassoun 2012: 45; all further references will 
be to this book unless otherwise indicated).
Essentially, Hassoun’s argument is contractualist in nature. 4 Coercive political 
institutions, whether domestic or global, require consent for legitimacy. But 
consent requires autonomy, and the subjects of these institutions cannot 
grant this consent if they lack the autonomy necessary for doing so. Coercive 
institutions must therefore ensure that their subjects have this autonomy, 
or else stop coercing them. Few non-anarchists would suggest dismantling 
the world’s coercive institutions completely, whether they be national or 
global, and so those institutions must meet substantive obligations to the 
world’s poor in order to ensure them the autonomy necessary for consent. 
Those poor, in turn, enjoy corresponding positive rights. In a world where 
the poorest of the poor suffer from terrible absolute levels of deprivation 
—malnutrition that may be sufficient to produce cognitive impairment, for 
example— these rights are likely to be substantial, and impose meaningful 
burdens upon the global order.
Hassoun hopes that her argument will prove convincing to many readers 
who might otherwise be skeptical of the existence of positive rights. She 
frames her argument to appeal to libertarians in particular, and devotes 
an entire chapter specifically to them (ch. 3). In this chapter, she usefully 
develops the tension between the libertarian ideas of consensualism (people 
can consent to anything) and minimalism (only a minimal, nightwatchman 
state can be a legitimate state). If an individual can consent to slavery, why 
can’t an entire society consent to a Soviet-style command economy (97)? 
Following A. John Simmons (2005), Hassoun believes that the tension should 
be resolved in favor of consensualism. But if consent really belongs at the 
heart of libertarian political theory, then libertarians have good reason to 
accept some version of the Autonomy Argument.
Hassoun’s Autonomy Argument, then, moves from legitimacy to consent, 
from consent to autonomy, and finally from legitimacy to autonomy. 
Legitimacy (on the part of coercive institutions) requires consent. Consent 
requires autonomy; those lacking autonomy cannot consent. And 
therefore legitimacy requires autonomy —specifically, it requires a coercive 
institution to ensure autonomy on the part of its subjects. It is the first move 
of the argument —the move from legitimacy to consent— that is especially 
critical. If this move is carried out successfully —if it can be established that 
legitimacy requires consent— then the conditions required for that consent 
(especially the conditions of autonomy upon which Hassoun focuses her 
4. I am using the term “contractualist” in the broad sense, and not the narrow sense given 
to it by Thomas Scanlon (1998). In this broad sense, the term refers to “the view that morality is 
based on contract or agreement” (Ashford and Mulgan 2012).
180 Peter Stone
LEAP 2 (2014)
attention) should follow straightforwardly. This first move, therefore, must 
be made with particular care.
Does legitimacy require consent? Answering this question requires both a 
conception of legitimacy and a conception of consent. On the understanding 
of legitimacy endorsed by Hassoun, “a coercive institution is legitimate if, 
and only if, the institution has the justification-right to use coercive force”. 
“An institution”, Hassoun further explains, “has a justification-right to make 
coercive rules and give coercive commands if it is morally permissible for it to 
do so” (47, emphasis in original). This justification-right is a “liberty right”, or 
what Hohfeld would call a privilege (Hohfeld 2010: 38-50). It is permissible for 
a legitimate coercive institution to use coercive force  —that is, nobody has a 
right to demand that it cease doing so— but nobody need have an obligation 
either to obey the institution or to help it enforce its will. Obviously, this is 
a very limited understanding of legitimacy, one that Hassoun distinguishes 
from justified authority. A coercive institution has the latter if and only if 
“individuals have a moral duty to comply with its rules” (49). This is probably 
closer to what many people envision by legitimacy, but Hassoun’s weaker 
definition of the term is all she needs for her project.
Hassoun’s understanding of legitimacy, while not uncontroversial, is 
quite clear and consistent. Her understanding of consent, however, is quite 
different. This understanding, I shall argue, is profoundly ambiguous in 
precisely the ways characteristic of the social contract theory tradition.
Hassoun addresses her argument to liberals, but only liberals of a 
contractualist bent. 5 She is not completely consistent here. On the one hand, 
she admits that her arguments “will not appeal to everyone who is concerned 
with freedom”. On the other hand, she claims that she is addressing “those 
who believe everyone should have some basic freedoms” (12, emphasis in 
original). On the one hand, her argument “is intended to appeal to everyone 
who takes a particularly liberal commitment to freedom seriously” (43). On 
the other hand, she explicitly contrasts liberalism with consequentialism, 
including utilitarianism (8). She seems to regard consequentialism and 
totalitarianism as equally alien to liberalism. (Indeed, totalitarianism and 
consequentialism are the only rivals to liberalism explicitly mentioned by 
her). Either Hassoun denies that John Stuart Mill took “a particularly liberal 
commitment to freedom seriously”, or else her argument is really intended 
to appeal only to a particular form of liberal —essentially, a liberal who 
emphasizes consent as the foundation for political legitimacy.
At times, Hassoun acknowledges that the consent-driven approach she 
considers is not all there is to liberalism. “Not all liberals” she admits, “will 
agree that respect for persons, autonomous or not, requires refraining from 
5. I discuss further Hassoun’s understanding of liberalism in Stone (Forthcoming a).
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forcing them to do things to which they cannot even object. Still, there is 
one important strand of liberal thought that supports this contention” (68, 
emphasis in original). But at the same time, she seems very reluctant to 
acknowledge any theory that does not put consent at its heart as liberal, or 
even sane. “What would accounts of legitimacy look like that denied that 
subjects must have basic freedoms under coercive institutions? On such 
accounts, coercive institutions could be legitimate even though people living 
under these institutions could not even freely object to them. It is hard to see 
how such institutions would not be totalitarian” (63, emphasis in original). 
Perhaps the line between consequentialism (à la John Stuart Mill) and 
totalitarianism is not (in Hassoun’s eyes, at least) all that thick after all. Still, 
the most charitable way to read Hassoun’s argument (a few inconsistencies 
notwithstanding) is as an appeal to the contractualist approach to liberal 
thought, to the exclusion of non-contractualist approaches. 6
Hassoun thus puts social contract theory, with its emphasis upon 
consent, at the heart of liberal theory (even though not all liberals are 
contractualists). In doing so, she acknowledges the profoundly ambiguous 
nature of the concept of consent that lies at the heart of social contract 
theory. Her acknowledgement of this point is worth quoting at some length:
At the heart of liberalism is concern for individual freedom. [A] powerful 
strand in liberal thought... expresses the idea that the actual relationship 
between the rulers and each person who is ruled must be voluntary in some 
way. Still, those who are concerned about individual freedom disagree 
about what makes this relationship voluntary. On liberal communitarian 
theories, for instance, this relationship is voluntary if the rulers allow or 
support communities of appropriate kinds that need not be explicitly 
consensual. Other liberal theories make consent central to legitimacy. 
On hypothetical consent theories, for instance, the relationship between 
rulers and ruled is only voluntary if (reasonable) people would agree to be 
subject to the rulers’ dictates were they asked. Democratic theory requires 
more. On democratic theory, legitimacy arises through the democratic 
process where the majority must actually consent to the institutions to 
which they are subject. Perhaps the most demanding theory of this type 
is actual consent theory. On actual consent theory, coercive institutions 
are legitimate only if they secure their subjects’ actual consent (57-58, 
emphasis in original).
Hassoun seems to believe that many (though not all) liberals want political 
relationships to be voluntary. Some of these liberals are social contract theorists, 
6. I am equating here contractualist approaches with consent-based approaches. This is 
not an uncontroversial move, but space prohibits any defense of it here.
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who may be actual consent theorists, democratic theorists, or hypothetical 
consent theorists. There are liberals, however, who are not social contract 
theorists and still want voluntariness to be part of political relationships. 
Among these are liberal communitarians. Hassoun never explains how this 
emphasis upon voluntariness works outside of the social contract theory 
tradition. Moreover, she devotes little time to liberal communitarianism (59-
60), and so I take contract theory to be the focus of her attention.
Hassoun thus identifies three forms of social contract theory —actual 
consent theory, democratic theory, and hypothetical consent theory. Each 
holds that political legitimacy depends upon some form of consent. They 
disagree regarding just what constitutes the appropriate form of consent. 
Rather than select one of these three forms of theory, Hassoun intends her 
argument to apply to them all. But as a result of this, whenever she invokes 
the idea that legitimacy depends upon consent —an idea upon which her 
Autonomy Argument depends— her account becomes ambiguous between 
three very different conceptions of consent.
Take actual consent theory, for example. At times, Hassoun avails herself 
of the conception of consent usually employed in settings unrelated to 
political theory. This is the conception upon which actual consent theory 
relies. On this conception, to consent means “to permit, approve, or agree; 
comply or yield”. 7 In the political context, a person consents to an institution 
when she indicates (through whatever means are appropriate) her agreement 
to conform to its dictates. The idea is that coercive institutions are only 
legitimate if their subjects agree to accept them.
Hassoun appeals to this conception of consent on many occasions. She 
explicitly acknowledges “an idea implicit in the social contract tradition —
focusing upon what social arrangements people could freely accept” (47). 
For people, according to Hassoun, to consent to coercive institutions is for 
them “to autonomously agree to their rules” (9). People must “agree to be 
subject to coercive institutions” (10). Moreover, Hassoun’s understanding of 
why legitimacy requires consent fits well with this understanding of consent. 
Coercive institutions require consent in order to be legitimate “because their 
subjects have a natural right to freedom” (18). 8 People have a right to be free, 
in other words, unless and until they agree otherwise. This agreement can 
take place at a high level. Hassoun writes:
7. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/consent?s=t, last accessed October 28, 2014.
8. Hassoun follows Hart (1955) here. Technically, she argues that “as long as one does not 
violate another’s rights, justification is necessary to abridge one’s natural right to freedom” (52; 
see also 49). As stated, this isn’t a very demanding condition; it just means you need to have a 
good reason to coerce someone, which presumably even fascists think they have. But Hassoun 
clearly means that because of the natural right to freedom, justification for coercion is owed to 
the people coerced, and must satisfy them. And this is effectively actual consent theory.
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Subjects may need to be able to process some information for autonomy, 
but they do not have to be able to agree to every single coercive rule to 
which they are subject. Subjects may only need to be able to autonomously 
agree to the general principles underlying their coercive institutions. 
Alternately, consent may require only that individuals autonomously 
agree to the general structure of coercive rules to which they are subject, 
not every subsidiary rule (29).
The point remains, however, that without explicit consent to coercive 
institutions (at some level), these institutions cannot legitimately act.
This understanding of consent has been present since the beginnings of 
social contract theory . But its limitations have been understood for almost as 
long . For anyone adhering to this conception of consent must either admit 
that no state has ever been legitimate, or else stretch the conception to its 
breaking point. No state, or coercive institution resembling a state, has ever 
obtained agreement to be bound by its rules from every one of its subjects, 
most have obtained such agreement from at best a handful of those subject 
to its rules (immigrants, perhaps), and many states have never obtained 
such agreement from any of their subjects. Moreover, it is hard to see how 
the ideal of actual consent could even be approached in the real world; in 
a society with even the most minimal level of diversity, it is impossible to 
imagine any political arrangement that all its potential subjects would be 
willing to authorize. Moreover, the costs of seeking actual consent on a wide 
scale (identifying possible terms, running those terms by citizens, adjusting 
those terms in light of the number unwilling to consent, etc.) are clearly 
prohibitive. Contract negotiations are difficult enough with two parties, let 
alone millions. 9 This point poses a problem for actual consent theory, except 
for philosophical anarchists willing to accept the illegitimacy of all realistic 
political arrangements (e.g., Wolff 1998).
This problem pushes consent theory towards counting as “consent” 
actions or omissions that would not count as consent in other contexts. This 
approach includes Locke’s reliance upon “tacit consent” —consent not overtly 
expressed, but made plain through one or another forms of cooperation with 
the government (paying taxes, using public services, etc.). But as Locke’s 
critics have long pointed out, it is very difficult to define “tacit consent” in 
a way that does not render virtually all governments into “governments by 
consent”. But there is another way to identify actions as “consensual” without 
reliance upon tacit consent. One could also count the expression of political 
opinion —primarily through voting— as an expression of consent. This is the 
approach taken in what Hassoun calls “democratic theory”.
9. On the central role of transaction costs in economics, see North 1990.
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Hassoun follows the social contract tradition in this regard. She 
acknowledges that “Actual consent theories are implausible. Few who have 
considered consent theory have defended actual consent since John Locke” 
(95). And her response is similar to that offered by those who have tried to 
save the social contract approach from the damning flaws of actual consent 
theory. At one point, she flirts with the Lockean idea of tacit consent. “It is 
obviously possible”, she writes, “for an institution to... secure as much (actual 
or tacit) consent as possible” (57, n. 44). But more typically, she appeals to a 
different variant of the second conception of consent employed by social 
contract theorists —one considerably weaker than the one involving explicit 
authorization. This is the understanding of consent employed within 
democratic theory.
Using this second conception, Hassoun appeals to “an idea implicit in 
the social contract tradition, that people must have basic freedoms under 
coercive rule” (43). This move transforms political consent into something 
like a right to political speech —or perhaps a right (following the U.S. Bill 
of Rights) to “petition” the coercive institution “for a redress of grievances”. 
People require autonomy so that they can “freely dissent” (56). They need to 
be able to “consent to, or dissent from, the rule of their coercive institutions” 
(28; see also 61, 62, 63). People need to be able to “shape the nature of their 
relationships with the coercive institutions to which they are subject” (28). 
Hassoun’s reframing of consent here seems to turn it into something like a 
right of political consultation, of the sort Rawls requires of all “well-ordered 
peoples” in The Law of Peoples (1999a: 63). This right includes “a right to 
dissent from the rule of coercive institutions by conscientious objection, 
non-violent protest, passive resistance, and so forth” (58; see also 62).
Finally, Hassoun is not afraid to appeal to the third conception of consent 
—hypothetical consent— although it receives relatively little of her attention. 
“On hypothetical consent theory”, she writes, 
“legitimacy requires that coercive institutions be organized according 
to those principles that would be chosen in an appropriately specified 
original position. Reasonable people in a liberally construed original 
position would only agree to be subject to coercive institutions if they are 
able to abide by, dissent from, or consent to their rule” (61). 
Hassoun here follows Rawls (1999b). but any meaningful form of 
hypothetical consent will appear very similar to this. That is, it will 
involve imagined consent granted under some suitably-specified set of 
counterfactual conditions.
Hassoun does not recognize any problem with appealing to these 
different conceptions of consent because she believes that the differences 
between them are unimportant for the purposes of her argument. 
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Whatever brand of contractualist you are, whatever form of consent you 
believe political legitimacy requires, the conclusions for her argument 
will be the same. But this conclusion is only tenable if one states the 
implications of contractualism at a very high level of abstraction. 
According to Hassoun, “democratic, hypothetical, and actual consent 
theorists have to agree to this much: Legitimacy requires that subjects be 
free to determine their actions and shape the nature of their relationships 
to coercive institutions” (59). But this claim is true only if one does not 
look too closely at just what it means for subjects to “shape the nature of 
their relationships to coercive institutions”. Daniel Dennett has observed 
that religious believers can only agree about the existence of God so long 
as they do not inquire too closely as to what they mean when they use the 
word “God”. Dennett explains:
For a thousand years, roughly, we’ve entertained a throng of variously 
deanthropomorphized, intellectualized concepts of God, all more or less 
peacefully coexisting in the minds of “believers”. Since everybody calls 
his or her version “God”, there is something “we can all agree about” —we 
all believe in God; we’re not atheists! But of course it doesn’t work that 
well. If Lucy believes that Rock (Hudson) is to die for, and Desi believes 
that Rock (music) is to die for, they really don’t agree on anything, do 
they? (Dennett 2006: 209) emphasis in original.
In a similar fashion, I fear that democratic, hypothetical, and actual 
consent theorists agree only that they like something called “government 
by consent”, and not on any meaningful understanding of what “government 
by consent” involves.
A close look at the requirements of consent generated by these three 
conceptions bears this point out, in a manner that generates serious 
problems for Hassoun’s argument. At one point, for example, she claims 
that “Political liberals almost unanimously agree, for instance, that people 
have a right to dissent from the rule of coercive institutions by conscientious 
objection, non-violent protest, passive resistance, and so forth” (58). But 
contrary to what Hassoun believes, it is not at all clear that all three types 
of consent theorists discussed by her would agree to any such thing. On 
the one hand, many libertarians are very attracted to the idea that consent 
authorizes practically anything. If someone wants to consent to slavery, then 
so be it. 10 At the same time, libertarians are usually lukewarm at best about 
10. As noted before, Hassoun argues that libertarians should embrace consensualism 
(people can consent to anything) rather than minimalism (only a minimal, nightwatchman state 
can be a legitimate state), because the two commitments are incompatible with one another. But 
Hassoun’s argument for consensualism can be used against her here. If consensualism ought to 
trump minimalism, as Hassoun believes it should, then shouldn’t it also trump political rights 
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democratic rights; being able to “shape the nature of their relationship” 
with government seems less important to them than being able to avoid the 
relationship to the greatest extent possible. And why should actual consent 
theorists require political arrangements to include democratic rights 
anyway? If people grant consent to an arrangement with such rights, fine, 
but they could just as easily consent to some other arrangement. (Granted, 
it might not be advisable for anyone to consent to arrangements without 
such rights, but that is of no concern to the actual consent theorist.) Indeed, 
the entire idea of a “right to dissent” must seem strange to an actual consent 
theorist. Why would one be entitled to a right to object to arrangements to 
which one has already granted consent?
On the other hand, those deeply concerned with rights of democratic 
participation (like most egalitarian liberals) have little use for actual consent. 11 
This is why Rawls, while originally attracted by Hart’s idea of a “right to liberty”, 
does not ground the natural duty to promote justice in anything resembling 
actual consent (Rawls 1999b, §19). 12 And this difference should not be 
surprising at all; the conceptions are so different that they must unsurprisingly 
play very different roles in any theory of government employing them.
Finally, the relationship between hypothetical consent and the right 
to “shape one’s relationship” with one’s political institutions is rather 
complicated. Consider the following claim Hassoun makes about 
hypothetical consent theory: “Reasonable people in a liberally construed 
original position would only agree to be subject to coercive institutions 
if they are able to abide by, dissent from, or consent to their rule” (61). It 
may be true that people would only grant hypothetical consent to political 
arrangements that guaranteed them certain democratic rights, such as a 
right to dissent. 13 In this regard, the democratic theorist and the hypothetical 
consent theorist may well reach the same conclusion, and endorse the same 
political system. But their reasons for reaching this conclusion would be 
very different. For the democratic theorist, it would be the democratic rights 
that provide the reason for calling the system consensual; the hypothetical 
agreement would be irrelevant. But for the hypothetical consent theorist, it 
would not be the democratic rights that form the critical locus of consent. 
as well? One could imagine a polity in which every citizen has consented to a democratic form 
of government, but one could just as easily imagine a polity in which everyone has consented to 
an authoritarian police state. While one may be (slightly) easier to imagine than the other, both 
must count as legitimate in the consensualist’s eyes.
11. In Albert Hirschman’s terms, libertarians tend to focus upon rights of exit, while 
democrats are centrally concerned with ensuring voice (Hirschman 1972), although as Hassoun 
notes libertarian notions of consent involve a bit more than simply a right of exit (98).
12. Actual consent does, for Rawls, ground obligations (as opposed to duties) which follow 
from accepting positions of responsibility in a just society (Rawls 1999b, §18).
13. This is why most social contract theorists who believe in hypothetical consent, such as 
Rawls, also believe in democratic rights.
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It would be the hypothetical consent itself. If people could conceivably 
consent to arrangements without democratic rights, then this would surely 
satisfy the hypothetical consent theorist. The democratic theorist and 
the hypothetical consent theorist thus have very different things in mind 
when they identify political systems as “consensual”, even if both endorse 
democratic institutions. When the democratic theorist and the hypothetical 
consent theorist say that the institutions they recommend enjoy “consent”, 
they simply do not mean the same thing, even if they happen to be speaking 
about the same institutions.
The differences between these three conceptions of consent are deep 
and profound, despite Hassoun’s tendency to oscillate between them. In 
principle, they are completely independent of each other. Indeed, they will 
occasionally be directly at odds with each other. This would happen, for 
example, if an agent explicitly agreed to be subject to a coercive institution 
that granted no right of dissent to its subjects, or that could not be accepted 
by people in the correctly-specified hypothetical scenario (e.g., Rawls’ 
original position). This is far from a hypothetical scenario. Libertarians, 
for example, regularly place little emphasis upon democratic rights; their 
concern lies with preventing democratic majorities from tampling upon 
property rights. This places actual consent at the centre of their concerns. 
(At the same time, the contrast Hassoun draws between consensualism and 
minimalism suggests this libertarian position is not completely coherent.) 
This is in stark contrast to democratic theorists, who wish all citizens to enjoy 
equal rights of democratic participation, even for those who do not place a 
premium upon democratic rights (like libertarians). And so not surprisingly, 
each conception of consent has its own defenders, with the defenders of one 
often stridently opposed to defenders of the other.
All of this renders Hassoun’s efforts to appeal to all three conceptions of 
consent at once deeply problematic. Hassoun wants to convince all liberals 
everywhere that they should demand positive rights for everyone (especially 
the poor), on the grounds that institutions cannot be grounded upon consent 
without the provision of such rights. But if consent can mean three different 
things, then Hassoun is making, not one argument, but three, each relying 
upon a different conception of consent. And there is no reason to assume 
that a political arrangement satisfying one conception of consent will satisfy 
the other two. But without this assumption, Hassoun will not be able to win 
the universal liberal assent to positive rights that she seeks.
3. CONCLUSION
Hassoun never commits to one or another conception of consent in 
Globalization and Global Justice. This is not a simple oversight on her part. 
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The goal that Hassoun wishes to achieve in the book using the Autonomy 
Argument is quite clear. “This book”, she writes, “may help extend the 
consensus on some important obligations to the poor” (12). Hassoun returns 
repeatedly to this goal throughout the book (e.g., 18). Hassoun is deeply 
concerned about the plight of the world’s poor, particularly the “bottom 
billion” which lacks many of the most elementary necessities. She describes 
this plight with a great deal of care and sympathy. And so her concern 
throughout the book is to win converts to a case for recognizing the people 
of the world —especially the poor— as possessing certain vitally important 
positive rights, rights which are currently being neglected and which the 
global political order must acknowledge. 14 In order to win as many converts 
as possible, Hassoun appeals to as much of the social contract tradition as 
she can. By starting “from an idea implicit in the social contract tradition, 
that people must have basic freedoms under coercive rule”, —however these 
basic freedoms are understood— Hassoun hopes to persuade everyone who 
accepts this idea “that there are positive obligations to ensure that people 
are capable of avoiding severe poverty” (43). 
Unfortunately, Hassoun’s argumentative strategy runs afoul of the real 
and significant differences between the various conceptions of consent to be 
found in the social contract tradition. One cannot argue, as Hassoun does, 
that legitimacy depends upon consent without specifying a conception of 
consent, unless the differences between conceptions are immaterial, which 
is highly unlikely. There may be good reasons for social contract theorists to 
accept Hassoun’s argument. But before one can judge this claim, one must 
know which version of social contract theory one has in mind.
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